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Within the past two decades, there has been a remarkable surge
of interest in an interdisciplinary cluster of legal concerns generally
referred to in the aggregate as "art law." Young lawyers seem to
find it particularly attractive. Scarcely a month goes by that I am not
called for employment advice by a law school senior or recent gradu-
ate eager to become its practitioner. Sadly, I find myself explaining
that there really isn't any such specific discipline, and even less of a
demand for anyone to practice it more than occasionally.
To be sure, an artist might now and again run up against an
unusual copyright problem or be in need of guidance through some
fascinating by-way of the droit moral ' Most often, though, the dis-
putes in which artists-like other human beings-are apt to find
themselves tend to involve their landlords, spouses or local dry
cleaners. What they don't need in those circumstances, I tell my call-
ers, is a lawyer whose chief qualification is a sensitivity to art. What
they do need is a first class and well-rounded attorney.
Albeit crestfallen, my callers generally persist . . .Well, then,
what about working for an art museum? Surely, things there must
be different. To begin with, I have to say, there are but a few Ameri-
can art museums-perhaps half-a-dozen--4hat can even afford to
hire their own staff counsel. Beyond that, museum counsel only
rarely get to deal with "art law." Their daily concerns are far more
* A.B. 1949 Brown University; L.L.B. 1956 Columbia University; Deputy Director,
Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, Smithsonian Institution; Vice-President, American
Association of Museums.
1. The doctrine of "droit moral" or "moral rights" provides that an artist has, inter alia,
the right to have his or her name associated with his work, the right to modify and correct the
work even if it is in the hands of a purchaser, the right to withdraw work after publication or
display, the right to prevent others from claiming credit for the work, and the right to prevent
distortion, mutilation or other alteration of his or her work. Many of these rights have not
received general recognition in the United States and must be secured by contractual agree-
ment. See generally, Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023
(1976); Comment, Artist' Personal Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human Can-
nonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PACIFIC L.J. 855 (1978); Comment, The Doctrine of Moral
Right.- A Study of the Law ofArtits, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1946).
likely to revolve about matters such as unrelated business income,
slip and fall cases, collective bargaining agreements, and compliance
with a broad range of equal opportunity regulations. What a mu-
seum needs when it hires in-house counsel is a strong generalist. The
bottom line is the same. The young attorney hoping to be helpful to
artists or museums would best be advised to spend his or her first
precious years at the bar gaining a broad experience and not con-
fined within so odd and only obscurely defined a specialty.
Only rarely has this advice been accepted with anything like
cheer. My callers still want to be "art lawyers."
When did the contours of "art law" begin to emerge, and what
might underlie its growing appeal? While stirrings of interest can be
traced back to the late 1950's (and even earlier in Europe), and while
the 1960's saw a sharp increase in both scholarly and legislative at-
tention to the special problems of the art world, it was not until 1971
that the American activity in this field began in earnest.
In the East, 1971 saw the publication of The VisualArtist and the
Law, a joint project of the Associated Councils of the Arts, the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York and the Volunteer Law-
yers for the Arts. Almost concurrently, across the country,
Professors John Merryman and Albert Elsen of Stanford initiated a
graduate level course (open to both law students and art historians)
that dealt with art-related legal and ethical questions. This course,
the first of its kind to be offered at an American university, proved
extremely popular and has been continuously offered ever since.
An event that was to prove seminal occurred in July 1972: the
presentation in New York City of the two-and-a-half day workshop
Legal and Business Problems of Art Galleries and Museums spon-
sored by the Practicing Law Institute (PLI) and directed (in the face
of considerable adversity) by Hedy Voigt. The faculty and partici-
pants included a wide range of attorneys, many of whom had there-
tofore been involved individually with the visual arts but who had
not until then had a forum in which to share this common interest.
Crippled at the start by the sudden illness of Dino D'Angelo, its
Chairman, the workshop nonetheless indicated that there were broad
areas of law impinging on both the visual arts and museums that
were in need of further exploration.
This first PLI workshop quickly engendered a series of succes-
sors. One of those in attendance was Peter Powers, the General
Counsel of the Smithsonian Institution. Convinced that the growing
legal entanglements in which museums were becoming enmeshed
were such as to justify a separate program of their own, he went to
work to establish one. The first course of study on Legal Problems of
Museum Administration was given at the Freer Gallery in Washing-
ton in March 1973. Presented by the American Law Institute-Amer-
ican Bar Association (ALI-ABA) Joint Committee on Continuing
Legal Education, it was co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution
with the cooperation of the American Association of Museums.
Since then, this course of study has been repeated annually and in
many cities throughout the country. Most recently, it was presented
at The University Museum in Philadelphia in March 1981 with more
than two hundred participants in attendance. The two articles in this
issue are by authors who have served as ALI-ABA faculty members.
Meanwhile, encouraged by the success of its first effort, PLI
organized a second workshop that was presented in New York in
January 1973 and repeated the following month (to the accompani-
ment of an earthquake) in Los Angeles. Franklin Feldman and I
were asked to serve as co-chairmen. The source materials we put
together for this second workshop were initially published as a
course handbook, then later expanded and supplemented into the
volume Art Works.- Law, Policy and Practice, which PLI published
in 1974.
As the 1970's proceeded, the hitherto sparse "art law" bookshelf
began to fill at an extraordinary rate. In 1974, Scott Hodes, who in
1966 had published one of the earliest books in the field, returned
with What Every Artist and Collector Should Know About the Law.
That same year, The VisualArtist and the Law was republished in a
revised edition, this time under the imprint of a commercial pub-
lisher. Leonard DuBoff-who had been an enthusiastic participant
at the 1973 PLI workshop in Los Angeles-brought out Art Law.-
Domestic and International in 1975. His Deskbook of Art Law was
published two years later. Tad Crawford's Legal Guidefor the Visual
Artist also appeared in 1977 as did Robert E. Duffy's Art Law. Rep-
resenting Artists, Dealers and Collectors. In 1979 came the long-
awaited Law, Ethics and the VisualArts by Professors Merryman and
Elsen. This past year, Aaron Milrad-also a participant in one of
PLI's 1973 workshops-joined with Ella Agnew to publish The Art
World- Law, Business and Practice in Canada, the first comprehen-
sive survey of the Canadian law in'this field.
Supplementing these texts has been a rising tide of periodical
literature. Notable issues of The Hastings Law Journal2 and the Con-
necticut Law Review3 were devoted to both the problems of nonprofit
arts institutions and those involving objects themselves. Art & the
Law, a quarterly publication of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, has
evolved since mid-decade from a casual newsletter to a serious jour-
nal publishing some of the best writing to be found today on current
2. 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1976).
3. 78 CONN. L. REV. 545 (1978).
art-related issues. A number of general art world publications such
as the Art Letter, the ARTnewsletter and the Stolen Art Alert are now
routinely providing up-to-date reports on legal matters. Meanwhile,
workshops and symposia continue to multiply. In November 1980,
the National Association of College and University Attorneys estab-
lished a new section to deal with the special problems of university
museums and their collections. The first meeting of this section was
held in Salt Lake City this past June.
What has spurred this extraordinary growth of interest over so
short a span? The conventional answer is that the explosion of val-
ues in the art market, the advent of blockbuster museum exhibitions,
and the incr~eased media attention focused on such matters as the
Rothko Estate4 and the Metropolitan Museum of Art's early 1970's
deaccessioning5 have combined to create an expanded public aware-
ness both of art and of art-related problems. While this is probably
so, I think there are several additional reasons.
To begin with, there is the art world itself-fascinating not only
for the objects at its center, but also for the extraordinary dramatis
personae by which they are surrounded. By contrast with such shop-
worn dyads as the vendor and the vendee or the landlord and the
tenant, in the richness and variety of its characters the art world
more closely resembles the commedia dell'arte. For Harlequin, Col-
umbine, Pierrot, and their companions it substitutes instead such ar-
chetypes as the True Collector, the Philistine Investor, the Dedicated
Artist, the Inauthentic Hack and such supporting players as the
Dealer, the Auctioneer, the Curator, the Scholar, the Critic, the
Trustee, and the Archaeologist. Finally, lurking in the wings and
always ready to pounce, is the Tax Man.
Each of these characters is perceived as embodying certain dis-
tinctive qualities. The interweaving of their confficting interests is in
itself dramatic. The manner in which, as their conflicts unfold, they
4. Inre Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 305, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). At
his death, abstract expressionist painter Mark Rothko left a considerable number of paintings
in his estate. One of the executors of the artist's estate was an officer of the gallery to which the
paintings were sold. A second executor, who acquiesced in the transactions, was himself an
artist and stood to gain some special advantage from the gallery. The third executor was
charged with failure to exercise his duty of reasonable care in the disposition of the works
when he suspected the personal and financial interests of his co-executors. The three were
surcharged for breach of trust, and the galleries that took with notice of the breach was charge-
able with the value of the unreturned paintings at the time of the court's decree.
For an account of the case by a journalist who covered the litigation, see SELDES, THE
LEGACY OF MARK ROTHKO (1978).
5. "Deaccessioning" refers to the removal of a work of art from the official collection of
an institution. For an account of the Metropolitan's deaccessioning activities, see Bator, Letter
to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973; Cunningham, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb.
3, 1973; Metropolitan Museum of Art, Report on Art Transactions 1971-73 (June 20, 1973),
reprinted in J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, 2 LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 7-111, 7-712, &
7-114 (1979).
will sometimes resort to disguises may approach the comic. And the
struggle of all (the Tax Man possibly excepted) to accommodate to a
system of laws not always well attuned to their special needs can
often produce the most ironic of denouements.
Consider, for example, the case of the True Collector seeking to
prove to the Tax Man that his activities are motivated primarily by
investment purposes and that therefore he ought to be allowed to
deduct the expenses of caring for his collection.6 On the basis of
Wrightsman v. United States,7 he would be well advised to mask
himself as the Philistine Investor and to play the public boor. Ide-
ally, his collection should be left crated in a distant warehouse.
Short of that, every indication of personal pleasure or enjoyment
should be forcibly suppressed. He ought to sneer at art on every
possible occasion, berate himself as a fool for ever buying "such
junk", and ridicule the still greater fools who will one day take it off
his hands at a profit. Above all, he should badger the Dealer almost
daily for the latest quotations from the market. The world--or at
least the Tax Man-must never discover that he is actually a True
Collector.
Should the True Collector (or even the Philistine Investor) as-
pire to a still higher state of tax grace-one in which he might also
claim deductions for depreciating his collection-he must turn things
even more topsy-turvy still. He would be best off by showing that
the objects in his collection were not works of art at all but simply
decorations (wall or table-top, as the case might be) which, at the
time of their acquisition, could have been anticipated to become ob-
solete after some determinable period. Taboo, under Revenue Rul-
ing 68-232,8 would be the ownership of anything so admirable as a
"valuable and treasured art piece."9 Required under D. Joseph
Judge v. Commissioner 0 -the case that dared to say that not every
framed rectangular piece of canvas covered with painted marks was
necessarily a work of art-would be proof of the useful life and sal-
vage value of each of the accumulated bits of decor that constitute
6. IRC § 212 entitles the taxpayer to deductions for "ordinary and necessary expenses"
incurred "for the production ... of income" or for the management, conservation, or mainte-
nance of property held for the production of income."
7. 428 F.2d 1316 (Ct. Cl. 1970). In Wrightsman, the court denied the deduction of ex-
penses incurred by the taxpayers in maintaining their collection, finding that although invest-
ment was a prominent purpose, it was not theprimary motivation. Id at 1222.
8. Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B. 79.
9. The official position of the Internal Revenue Service regarding the depreciation of art
work as set forth in Revenue Ruling 68-232 is as follows:
A valuable and treasured art piece does not have a determinable useful life. While
the actual physical condition of the property may influence the value placed on the
object, it will not ordinarily limit or determine the useful life. Accordingly, deprecia-
tion of works of art generally is not allowable.
Id
10. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1264 (1976).
his collection. "1
It should not be supposed that the advantage to the True Collec-
tor of denigrating his collection is restricted to situations that involve
the Tax Man. Under California's recently enacted Art Preservation
Act,' 2 for example, the True Collector from whom a Dedicated Art-
ist is seeking damages because a work of his creation has been inten-
tionally mutilated would not be liable unless it could be proven that
the work was of "recognized quality."' 3 Whatever the True Collec-
tor could do to offset such proof ("Me a connoisseur? You're loco.
In art, I'm just an ignoramus. I would only buy stuff by Inauthentic
Hacks. And I got the witnesses to prove it.") would assist his de-
fense. In a more extreme case, the Dealer charged in New York with
larcenously converting the property of an Inauthentic Hack might
have a complete defense by showing that the objects in which he
deals are not "works of fine art" at all but merely items of wall de-
cor. By so doing, he could take himself beyond the reach of the
General Business Law provisions that specially define the artist-
dealer relationship as one of principal and agent. 4
The Dedicated Artist as well may sometimes have to put on a
different mask in order to secure a particular legal advantage. Coun-
terpoised against our conventional expectations of what might give
meaning to his life-unswerving vision, fierce integrity and even
some carelessness of worldly things-Churchman v. Commissioner'"
suggests that a different set of values might serve him better if the
still struggling Dedicated Artist's art-related expenses are to be de-
ductible for federal income tax purposes. Paramount must be a
craving for profit, regardless of whether the same is sought as a sym-
bol of success (museum exhibitions and good reviews, without profit-
able sales, are less useful symbols), or as "the pathway to material
wealth."' 6 Important too is that his creative (or "recreational") ac-
tivities not absorb too much of his day but that some substantial time
be devoted to marketing, an activity "where the recreational element
11. Id at 1273.
12. The California Art Preservation Act, 1979 CAL. STAT. ch. 409, § I (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 987 (Deering Supp. 1981)).
13. The California Art Preservation Act defines "fine art" as "an original painting, sculp-
ture, or drawing of recognized quality," but excludes "work prepared under contract for com-
mercial use by its purchaser." CAL. CI. CODE § 967(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1981).
14. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 219-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
15. 68 T.C. 696 (1977). In Churchmen, the Commissioner argued that the taxpayer-artist
was a "hobbyist," that she did not engage in her artistic endeavors for profit, and that therefore
IRC § 183 applied. Section 183 allows deductions for ordinary and necessary expenses arising
from an activity not engaged in for profit only to the extent of the gross income derived from
the activity less the amount of those deductions, such as taxes and interest, that are allowable
regardless of whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit. The court held for the tax-
payer, however, and allowed the deduction in full of her art-related expenses under sections
162 and 165.
16. Churchman v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 696, 703 (1977).
is minimal." 7 To stubbornly persist in a medium or technique de-
spite the rebuffs of the market would not be a positive sign of profit-
seeking. Far better, apparently, would be an annual change in style,
preferably one based on a current survey of what is then "hottest" in
the art market.
Here, again, is that awkward "fit" between the concerns of two
systems-art and the law-that gives a peculiar twist to so much in
this field. As a way of safeguarding the fisc against underwriting the
costs of what might be only a hobby, the Churchman approach
makes eminently good sense. To propose some alternative that the
Dedicated Artist might find more appropriate--simply, for example,
to put his painting or sculpture itself before a body of Critics, Cura-
tors, or peers that might pass on its merits-would be to misap-
prehend the issue. The Internal Revenue Code is indifferent to the
quality of art. Its concern in such situations is whether expenses are
merely personal or have been incurred in a quest for profit. The tilt,
unfortunately, is toward the Inauthentic Hack.
Another aspect of "art law," and one that often adds to its pi-
quancy, is the odd way in which it sometimes precipitates the courts
into unaccustomed questions of artistic quality or historical authen-
ticity. We have come a long way since Mr. Justice Holmes' familiar
caution, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 18 that it would
be "a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."' 9 We have
even come a considerable way since the days of Brancusi v. United
States, 20 and other customs cases when the statutory question the
courts had to answer was simply "Is it art?"
In Furstenberg v. United States,2 for example, the United States
Court of Claims found itself inescapably saddled with the task of
distinguishing between the artistic merits of two paintings by Co-
rot--one the subject (in a charitable deduction contest) of a disputed
valuation and the other the "comparable" that the taxpayer had
proffered in support of her claim. Undaunted, the Court seized the
critical gauntlet. Per curiam, it pronounced: "From the standpoint
of artistic quality, however, Girl in Red with Mandolin is substantially
superior to La Meditation, as the former is one of Corot's finest
works whereas La Meditation . . . is near the average in artistic
17. "While petitioner's artwork involved recreational and personal elements, her work
did not stop at the creative stage but went into the marketing phase of the art business where
the recreational element is minimal." Id at 702.
18. 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (application of copyright laws to three chromolithographic circus
advertisements).
19. Id at 251.
20. T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Doc. 428 (1928).
21. 595 F.2d 603 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
quality among the entire group of Corot's figure paintings. '22
In Dawson v. G. Malin, Inc., 23 a Federal District Judge found
himself confronted with the demand that, as the trier of facts, he
undertake the task of attributing a group of Chinese antiquities-the
subject of an action by a True Collector against a Dealer for breach
of warranty under one of New York's special art statutes-to their
precise dynastic origins. Sidestepping any such attribution as "by its
very nature an inexact science" and "necessarily . . .imprecise, 24
the Judge arrived at a more manageable approach: whether there
had been a reasonable basis in fact at the time they were made for
the Dealer's representations as to the origin of these antiquities,
"with the question of whether there was such a reasonable basis in
fact being measured by the expert testimony provided at the trial.
'25
There ensued a classic battle of experts-in this instance, of Schol-
ars-and a delightful excursion into the arcane. In the footnotes ap-
peared such lyric poetry as:
The fair sky is enlightened by a
distant sail,
The bright moon is illuminated by
a pureness of the willows and clouds,
People drift away with the flowing
waters but nature remains forever,
Splashing waves play harmonious songs as
the water's vapor rise from the lake
like puffs of smoke.26
Such are some of "art law's" many pleasures. That it can some-
times be so diverting a field should not, however, mislead us as to the
importance of what its practitioners have accomplished or what re-
mains to be done. At the market level, special legislation adopted
over the past fifteen years in such major art market states as New
York,27 Illinois,2" and California29 has substantially changed the re-
lationships among artists, dealers and collectors, largely for the bet-
ter. Imbalances have been corrected, more stringent disclosure
standards have been imposed, and the market (despite occasional
dire predictions) has been no less robust for these changes.
At the institutional level, enormous progress has been made in
better defining the responsibilities of trustees and in adding legal
force to standards (applicable to trustees and staff alike) that were
hitherto considered, when they were considered at all, as no more
22. Id at 608.
23. 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
24. Id at 467.
25. Id
26. Id at 470 n.10.
27. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 219 & 219-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
28. See, e.g., ILL. AN,. STAT. Ch. 121 , § 361-69 (Smith-Hurd Supp, 1981-82).
29. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1740-45 (Decring 1972).
than ethical. That museums hold their collections in what is essen-
tially a public trust is today a widely-shared perception from which
both they and their users have benefited enormously.
30
By contrast, the problems of balancing competing interests in
such federally dominated areas of the law as copyright and taxa-
tion3 l seem far from any satisfactory resolution. Thorny too are
questions that concern the international movement of art and the
protection of archaeological sites.32 As to these, the art world itself
has thus far resisted any consensus solution. A wider concern is
whether the arts should receive public funding and, if so, by what
means. 3 To many of these issues, the art world's diverse cast of
characters (as well as the general public) brings strong and often op-
posing views. A major contribution of "art law" has been to help
focus the terms of their debate and define the issues that must be
addressed.
The arts and the institutions that embody them are too vital to
our national life to be left adrift in a legal system that often treats
them in too general a fashion. Attention should be paid to their spe-
cial needs and even peculiarities. By assembling this special issue,
the editors of the Dickinson Law Review have contributed toward
that end.3 4  Hopefully, their efforts will serve to introduce a still
broader public to a field of the law that-if yet too diffuse to consti-
tute a distinct specialty and still far from able to furnish remunera-
tive employment to my monthly callers-should long continue to
provide a variety of both pleasures and worthwhile tasks for those
who pursue it.
30. See Marsh, Governance of Non-Profit Organizations. An Appropriate Standard of Con-
duct For Trustees and Directors of Museums and Other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK. L. REV.
607 (1981).
31. See Comment, Tax Incentivesfor the Support of the Arts In Defense ofthe Charitable
Deduction, 85 DICK. L. REv. 663 (1981).
32. See McAlee, From the Boston Raphael to Peruvian Pots. Limitations on the Importa-
tion of Art into the United States, 85 DIcK. L. REv. 565 (1981).
33. See Comment, Mechanisms for Control and Distribution of Public Funds to the Art
Community, 85 DICK. L. REV. 629 (1981).
34. The editors wish to thank the members of the Law and the Arts Seminar, conducted
by Professor Geoffrey Scott, for their interest and support. In particular, the following stu-
dents deserve recognition for their assistance: Jeffrey Bitzer, Rita Frealing, Katherine Gra-
ham, and Peter Kramer.

